new jersey laws

As a follow up to a recent post the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, on a concurring vote, approved House Bill 2295 yesterday (199-0).  The House originally passed HB 2295 on June 11, 2008. After the House originally approved the Bill in June, it was then sent to the Senate. The Senate approved the Bill, but also added additional language to the Bill in conjunction with Senate Bill 963.

SB 963 amends the Uniform Condominium Act by furthering the abilities of older communities to amend their declaration of covenants in order to better serve and provide for the members of their communities. The amended HB 2295 passed the senate on Monday June 30, 2008, and after having passed for the second time in the House yesterday, will now move to Governor Rendell for final approval.

The Community Associations Institute of Pennsylvania’s Legislative Action Committee (link to position papers) has long supported HB 2295, as well as SB 963. HB 2295 is a very important and positive piece of legislation which will enable associations to provide the highest level of service to unit owners.

Gary S. Forshner and Vincent J. Mangini, Shareholders of Stark & Stark's Real Estate, Zoning and Land Use Group authored the article Supreme Court Gives Developers Leg Up for the June 23, 2008 edition of the New Jersey Lawyer.

The article discusses the March 31, 2008 Supreme Court decision in Toll Bros. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, in which the court held that a developer cannot be required by contract to provide offtract improvements that offend the nexus and proportionality test mandated by constitutional principles and by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-42.

You can read the full article here.

In a case decided on June 17, 2008, a New Jersey appeals court distinguished the roles of a Custody Mediators from Parenting Coordinators in divorce cases.

Essentially, a Custody Mediator, whether court-appointed or privately chosen, is barred from making any recommendations to the court concerning custody or parenting time. A Parenting Coordinator, on the  other hand, whether appointed or chosen, may do so, although the court opined that the "preferable practice" would be to consult with the parents and their attorneys beforehand.

This case demonstrates the need for precise definitions in order to avoid unexpected or unpleasant results. If in doubt, consult an attorney before deciding how to proceed.

David J. Byrne, Shareholder and Co-Chair of Stark & Stark's Community Associations group, authored the article for the June 23, 2008 edition of the New Jersey Law Journal.

The article discusses New Jersey’s Municipal Services Act as it turned 18 earlier this year. The Act states that a municipality must either provide certain services to a private community or reimburse that particular private community the cost of those services, including snow removal, collection of trash or recyclables, and the lighting of roads. Currently, New Jersey remains the only state in the union with such a statute. Mr. Byrne discusses the history of The Act, the effects The Act has had on community associations in New Jersey and how The Act relates to the New Jersey’s Planned Real Estate Development Full Disclosure Act.

You can read the full article here (PDF).

On June 19, 2008 a New Jersey appeals court determined that a  police chief's retirement, even if involuntary as claimed, was not sufficient to modify his alimony obligation. The Court found that the trial judge had failed to consider numerous other factors which had  bearing on whether alimony should be reduced or terminated, as defined by statute and case law.

Thus, it is important for persons on the verge of retirement and paying alimony, or persons to whom alimony is being paid in such circumstances, obtain sound legal advice and plan accordingly.

In a decision released for publication on June 16, 2008, the New Jersey Appellate Division held that parenting or custody issues can not be submitted to binding arbitration notwithstanding the parties agreement or even a Court Order. (Fawzy v Fawzy, Judge Simonelli)

In Fawzy the parties agreed, on the record and in open Court, to submit their parenting disagreement to binding arbitration. The parties agreement was then reduced ot a Court Order.
The husband, apparently believing that the arbitration was not proceeding according to his liking, applied to the Court to be released from his agreement to arbitrate the matter and, instead, to have his day in Court.

The Trial Court held Mr. Fawzy to his agreement to arbitrate, but the Appellate Division reversed.
The Appellate Division reasoned that submission of parenting issues to binding arbitration deprived the Court of its parens patrie jurisdiction, and that only the Court (not an arbitrator) can determine what is or is not in the "best interests" of the children.

In all due respect to a very learned panel of the Appellate Division, their decision, although, perhaps, technically correct based upon the time worn doctrine of parens patrie (the assumption that the State is the ultimate parent of all children with rights which are superior to and even exceed those the child's parents) is contrary to public policy which dictates in favor of divorce litigants resolving their disagreements by alterative resolution techniques (mediation or arbitration).

Virtually all experienced Divorce Attorneys would concur that in cases involving custody or parenting issues litigation is often an ineffective means of resolving the issues. It is not uncommon for competent counsel to advise their clients that such matters do not belong in the Court system and should be resolved between the parties and by alternate means. The Fawzy case could certainly be taken a setback to the mediation and arbitration process which is so desperately needed in the Family Courts.

There are any number of very experienced Arbitrators in new Jersey. Some are extremely competent practicing Divorce Attorneys. Some are experienced mental health professionals. Many have served as Family Court Judges, Appellate Judges or even Supreme Court Justices.
Many have extensive background, understanding and training in matters involving the "best interests" of children.

For the Appellate Division to apparently assume that only a sitting Family Court Judge (even one who has little or no experience or background in such matters) can fulfill the State's Parens Patire responsibility of protecting the best interests of the State's children is, at best, premised upon little more than the assumption that a black robe vests the wearer with a innate understanding that can not be delegated to competent counsel, a skilled arbitrator or even well meaning parents seeking to avoid the emotional trauma and cost of litigation.

HB 2295 will provide a condominium association with a"super-priority" lien for assessments payable by unit owners. This means thatan association will be able to collect up to six months of unpaid assessmentsfrom unit owners in the event of a judicial sale, and/or foreclosure of a unit.The money collected from the assessments enable an association to provide unitowners with maintenance services required in accordance with the association'scontracts and statutory responsibilities.

Taking away the right of an association to collect unpaidassessments after the judicial sale of a unit will only negatively affect theassociation and it's unit owners. Reinstating the original language used priorto the amendment of The Act in 2004 will enable community associations tocontinually provide the level of service unit owners have come to expect. 

If you would like additional information regarding HB 2295 and how this legislation can impact your association, please contact Christopher Florio at 609.895.7335, or by email at cflorio@stark-stark.com.

HB 2295 will provide a condominium association with a “super-priority” lien for assessments payable by unit owners. This means that an association will be able to collect up to six months of unpaid assessments from unit owners in the event of a judicial sale, and/or foreclosure of a unit. The money collected from the assessments enable an association to provide unit owners with maintenance services required in accordance with the association’s contracts and statutory responsibilities.

Takingaway the right of an association to collect unpaid assessments after the judicial sale of a unit will only negatively affect the association and it’s unit owners. Reinstating the original language used prior to the amendment of The Act in 2004 will enable community associations to continually provide the level of service unit owners have come to expect.

In a previous blog post I discussed House Bill 790 in Vermont which would have had a substantial negative impact upon franchising in Vermont.  It would essentially void non-compete provisions in franchise agreements. 

The Bill apparently languished in committee through the end of the May session, which effectively kills it for the time being.  The danger of such bills is that they tend to leach into “sister” states.  The demise of the Vermont Bill is a positive development for franchisors and helps strengthen the franchise community in general because it protects the general integrity of franchise systems.

In Cottelli v. Leisure Village East Association, plaintiff slipped and fell on snow and ice outside of the condominium association. After the plaintiff filed suit, and before the deposition of the association could occur, the association filed a summary judgment motion stating that tort immunity language within their governing documents absolved them from liability in this case.

The association’s governing documents states, “Except for willful or gross negligence, Association not label for bodily injury." The Appellate Division granted summary judgment, but also stated that additional facts relating to the case need to be found in order to determine whether or not negligence or willful misconduct existed on the part of the association. 

This case follows logically what should occur with the tort immunity statute.  While an association may eventually win the case, in order to make certain there is no appeal that can be won, all discovery should be completed so there are no facts in controversy, and the trier of fact (in this case, the judge) can make a determination if tort immunity statute can be utilized in the instant case.

Scott I. Unger, Shareholder of Stark & Stark's Litigation group authored the article Minority Oppression Claims: A Primer on Acting, Standing, Remedies and Valuation for the June 16, 2008 edition of the New Jersey Law Journal.

The article addresses what constitutes actionable minority oppression, who has standing to assert minority oppression claims, the remedies available to oppressed parties and the meaning of “fair value” with respect to a court-ordered buyout of a minority shareholder’s interest in the closely held company.

You can read the full article here.

Bill Singer, Shareholder of Stark & Stark's Securities Practice group, was interviewed for Bloomberg Radio regarding the government's case against former Bear Stearns' hedge-fund managers Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tanni after they were indicted on June 19, 2008.

Mr. Singer outlines possible strategies for both the prosecution and defense, and discusses the failure of U.S. regulators prior to the collapse of the mortgage market. You can read a full article discussing the indictment here.

You can download the full interview here. (3.8 MB)

During the past decade divorce lawyers have witnessed the steady growth of "Alternate Dispute Resolution" (ADR) techniques such as mediation and binding arbitration of matrimonial issues. While ADR may be a viable option to a judicial decision, a recent case demonstrates the limits of binding arbitration in the divorce context.

On June 16 a New Jersey appeals court ruled that a divorcing couple could not, as a matter of law, bargain away a court's obligation to review the best interests of their children by agreeing to be bound by an arbitrator's decision respecting child support and, by implication, custody or parenting time.

The key word is "binding". In the above case, the parties had initially agreed that the arbitrator's decision concerning child support would be final and not subject to judicial review or appeal. The appellate court disagreed, stating that courts have a "non-delegable, special supervisory function" when it comes to children which cannot be bargained away and voided the parties' agreement.

The point is that persons seeking to resolve their matrimonial differences through ADR need to be aware of what can and cannot be accomplished by seeking advice from skilled and independent attorneys before and during the process.

Gerald Faber, Shareholder of Stark & Stark's Employment, Business & Corporate and Real Estate, Zoning & Land Use Groups authored the article Regulatory Hammer Strikes Again for the June 9, 2008 edition of the New Jersey Lawyer.

The article discusses a company's need to have a clear understanding of the Construction Industry Independent Contractor Act (CIICA), as well as the need for employers to follow the requirements outlined in the Act. Mr. Faber discusses the need for an employer to exercise control over the methods and quality of a worker's performance in order to maintain a positive and productive employment relationship.

You can read the full article here. (PDF)

When buying and selling a home, many believe that they can represent themselves, or that the others involved in the house sales transaction will adequately protect their interests. But is this a penny-wise and pound foolish approach? Just what does an attorney do when representing a buyer or seller?

The attorney’s obligation is to represent their client’s interest exclusively. They do not represent the lender, nor the realtors, nor the title company. Each of those parties are receiving payment based generally on the size of the transaction and their fees are contingent upon the sale going through.

First, an attorney helps their client understand and negotiate the terms of the Contract of Sale. While frequently a standard real estate broker form contract is used to commence the purchase/sales process, a party’s interest may need to be protected with additional provisions. For a buyer, perhaps the contract needs to be conditioned upon the sale of their existing home. For a seller, perhaps there are conditions at the property or an easement or restriction which need to be mentioned, or items affixed to the house which the seller wants to remove. Or, for either party, perhaps it is essential that the closing occur no later than a certain date. In all these situations, terms can be added to insure this.

Second, inspection issues often spur additional negotiations. Do buyers or sellers want repairs, or should credits be provided. An attorney can provide assistance in these negotiations.

Third, issues which effect title may arise. For a seller, there may be old mortgages from a prior loan or owner which have been paid off, but not removed from the record and perhaps the lender no longer exists - or has merged with another bank. These will need to be addressed prior to sale. For a buyer, there may be limitations on the use of the property which make the property unacceptable to a buyer. Perhaps it has wider setbacks than what the local zoning ordinances require, or perhaps there are limitations as to how the property may be used. Or, perhaps there is a sewer easement or a pipeline easement running through the property so that an intended pool the buyer sought to install would not be possible. These are all issues that an attorney, after consultation with their client and being informed of the client’s expectations, can be in a position to protect.

Fourth, for Sellers, the attorney will prepare all the necessary transfer documents. For buyers, the attorney will assist with the loan documentation and execution of the mortgage documents.

Finally, issues can arise at the actual closing. It may be an explanation of the loan documents to the buyer, a walk-through issue which needs to be negotiated or a last minute title issue raised by the final run-down of title. A buyer’s or seller’s attorney present at closing can explain the consequences and offer options available to remedy the situation.

Michael J. Fekete, member of Stark & Stark's Business & Corporate group, authored the article Contractors Be Warned: Don't Get Nailed for the May 5, 2008 edition of the New Jersey Law Journal.

Mr. Fekete's article discusses how contractors can avoid potential liabilities by complying with the New Jersey Home Improvement Contractors Act. While compliance with the regulations alone will not protect a contractor from claims regarding workmanship, adhering to the regulations will reduce the chances that litigation will occur.

You can read the full article here.

On April 22, 2008, the New Jersey Law Revision Commission issued a revised draft of its tentative report on the Construction Lien Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:44-1, et seq., which includes numerous suggestions that, if enacted, would serve to clarify some and completely change other provisions of the statute. There are also some brand new sections proposed for the Construction Lien Law. One example of the Commission’s recommended legislative amendments relates to the Construction Lien Law’s definitions section. The Commission proposes revising the meaning of certain terms, such as “contract” and “residential construction contract” and creating new definitions for terms that had not previously been defined in the statute, such as “dwelling,” “lien fund” and “residential unit.”

Another example is the proposed clarification of the language governing entitlement to liens for work performed and materials or equipment provided on leased property at N.J.S.A. 2A:44-3. Presently, a construction lien attaches to the leasehold estate rather than the interest of the owner in the real property, unless the owner-landlord authorized in writing the specific improvement contracted to be installed at the leased premises. This essentially was how the Appellate Division read N.J.S.A. 2A:44-3 in its 2007 unreported decision captioned Cherry Hill Self Storage, LLC v. Racanelli Construction Company, Inc. The proposed change, if enacted, would allow construction liens for improvements to leased premises to attach to the owner-landlord’s interest in the real property without a separate written authorization for a given improvement provided that “the tenant’s lease agreement, signed by the owner, permits the improvement without further owner authorization[,]” and would thereby legislatively overrule the Cherry Hill Self Storage case.

The Commission’s revised draft tentative report also contains revisions to the requirements for the filing of lien claims at N.J.S.A. 2A:44-6, which specifies what must be included in a lien claim and increases the amount of time to file lien claims for work performed and materials or equipment provided on residential construction contract from 90 to 120 days. Additionally, among other things, the Commission seeks to create a new section - proposed to be codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:44-9.1 - that outlines in detail the method for calculating a lien fund, an owner’s maximum liability and impermissible reductions from a lien fund. The addition of proposed N.J.S.A. 2A:44-9.1 is one of the most significant changes to the Construction Lien Law recommended by the Commission, which was prompted, at least in part, by a number of case decisions, such as Labov Mechanical, Inc. v. East Cost Power, L.L.C., 377 N.J.Super. 240 (App. Div. 2005) and Craft v. Stevenson Lumber Yard, Inc., 179 N.J. 56 (2004).

It is uncertain what the fate of the aforesaid proposed legislative revisions will be in the coming months. However, it is interesting to see how a handful of judicial rulings on the Construction Lien Law have sparked debate and provided the basis potentially for some decisive legislative action in this area of law.

Massachusetts and, perhaps, California now permit Same Sex Marriages. Several States (including New Jersey) permit same sex Civil Unions or Domestic Partnerships.

A Same Sex Marriage can only be dissolved by a divorce and most Civil Union and Domestic Partnership statutes provide that they can only be terminated by an action tantamount to a divorce. The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, has cast into doubt whether a State which does not permit Same Sex marriages or Civil Unions can dissolve such relationships.

The situation arises when parties who have entered into a same sex marriage or civil union now reside within the jurisdiction of a non-sanctioning State. In Chanbers v. Ormiston 935 Atl 2nd 956 (RI 2007) the Rhode Island Supreme held that the Courts of Rhode Island had no jurisdiction to terminate a Same Sex Marriage or Civil Union entered into in another State on the basis that Rhode Island does not authorize such unions. In a decision based upon the strict construction of its Family Court enabling statutes, the Court ruled that the Rhode Island Family Courts only had authority to dissolve "marriages" as defined and authorized by their State law. Thus, the litigants would be required, under the Rhode Island Supreme Court reasoning, to return to and re-establish residency in the (or, presumably, a) State which authorized their marriage or union.

In some case, New Jersey for example, that would require a period of 1 year of such residency prior to instituting the action to dissolve the Civil Union. It is respectfully submitted that such consequences offend the notions of Equal Process or Full Faith and Credit recognition of the Statutes of a sister state. It would seem that Rhode Island's apparent opposition to the underlying concepts of same sex marriages or civil unions has controlled its decision, not fundamental concepts of Equal Protection and Full Faith and Credit.

Should the Rhode Island reasoning become the prevailing law, it is further submitted that significant inequities will be visited upon person who entered into legal and binding relationships in their State of residence at that time simply because they subsequently relocate to another State which disagrees with the underlying validity of their relationship. Consider, for example, the inequity of requiring the party seeking the termination of the relationship to surrender their employment in order to return to the State of origin of their relationship in order to terminate the relationship.
Suppose there are children of the relationship, the children must be removed from school and relocated simply so that their parents may terminate their relationship.

In no other area of Family Law does a terminating state refuse to terminate a marriage because it does not comply with the marriage laws of that State. Suppose , for example, persons were married at age 16;the legally permitted age under the law of the State of origin of the marriage, but not permitted in the terminating state. Would or should the terminating State refuse jurisdiction to terminate the marriage because it does not comport with it us marriage statutes? Of course not.

From this author's perspective, it is time for our Courts and Legislatures, and most importantly our Family Courts as Courts of Equity, to give Equal Protection to all of our citizens, not simply those of heterosexual orientation.

Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, et al.

On May 2, 2008, the Appellate Division in Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, et al. evaluated, among other issues, the validity of a redevelopment plan that required the municipal governing body to review of all proposed redevelopment projects for consistency with the redevelopment plan and any relevant redeveloper agreement as a prerequisite to the filing of an application for development with the local planning board - in this case a joint board - and prohibited the joint board from granting any variances from the plan requiring, instead, that any such deviations be approved by the governing body by way of amendment to the redevelopment plan. Ultimately, the Court upheld the redevelopment plan, but was careful to limit its ruling strictly to the circumstances presented.

In this matter, the plaintiff had sought consistency review for a redevelopment project within a redevelopment zone that contained uses not permitted in the redevelopment plan or by the underlying zoning district regulations for the subject property and proposed an intensity of development well in excess of permitted densities. When the municipal governing body failed to conduct a review of the plaintiff’s redevelopment proposal for consistency with the redevelopment plan in a timely manner, the plaintiff proceeded to file an application for variances directly with the joint board. However, this application was deemed incomplete due to the lack of the aforesaid consistency review. The plaintiff then brought suit against the municipal governing body and the joint board alleging, among other things, that the redevelopment plan was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable and that the joint board unduly delayed its review of the application for variances and, thereby, should have been approved.

Although the Appellate Division determined that the plaintiff’s challenge to the redevelopment plan was barred by the 45-day appeal period provided by the Rules of Court, the Appellate Division addressed the plaintiff’s substantive challenge to the review procedures contained in the redevelopment plan and rejected it. According to the Court, nothing in the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:12A-1, et seq. (“LRHL”), the governing statute, “foreclose[s] a redevelopment plan from specifying, as here, that an applicant must present its proposal initially to the governing body for a determination of consistency.” Moreover, “[i]t is entirely sensible for the municipal governing body, rather than the municipal land use board or boards, to conduct an initial review of a developer’s proposal to assure that it does not amount, in effect, to a de facto repeal of, or amendment to, the redevelopment plan.”

The Appellate Division also upheld the provision in the municipality’s redevelopment plan that restricted the joint board’s review of variance applications as applied to the instant circumstances where “the massive scope of plaintiff’s proposal” was in effect an attempt “to rezone the entire redevelopment area.” However, the Court noted that had plaintiff sought approval of “a ‘minor exception’ to the requirements of the Redevelopment Plan, as we countenanced in Weeden [v. City Council of Trenton, 391 N.J.Super. 214 certif. denied 192 N.J. 73 (2007),] it might not have permitted the governing body to foreclose such consideration.

In short, although a victory for the municipality, the Appellate Division’s decision in Milford Mill 128, LLC v. Borough of Milford, et al. should be viewed with caution by local governments that are intent upon restricting redevelopment of designated areas through the use of pre-application review procedures or other development controls. Indeed, the Court made clear in its decision that redevelopment plans will not pass muster if they have the effect of depriving developers or landowners “of the opportunity to make use of the property in an economically productive manner.” The Milford Mill 128 opinion has been approved for publication and is officially reported at 400 N.J.Super. 96 (App. Div. 2008).

Condominiums and HOAs often proceed in transition with the concern that it may not get defects fixed, damages paid and/or funds contributed by developers because a developer may be insolvent, bankrupt, an inactive "shell" company or otherwise asset-less. While it is always good to enter a transition with some trepidation, any board that enters into a transition with any developer - whether solvent or insolvent - without considering the existence and provisions of its developer's commercial general liability policy ("CGL") is doing its members a disservice. It is very often the case that a carrier via its CGL will have to pay developer - and then an association - for damages that resulted from faulty work done by that developer's subcontractor.

In just the past 12 months courts throughout the country have held carriers, via CGL, liable for construction-related damages. Most recently, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously ruled that a carrier must pay damages resulting from a subcontractor's defective work. In this case, the court considered whether a CGL, issued after 1986, and to a general contractor, provided coverage when a claim is made against the contractor for damage to the completed project caused by a subcontractor's defective work. In this case, after the sale of homes, damage to foundations, drywall and other interior portions was discovered. There as no dispute that the cause of this damage was a subcontractor's use of poor soil and improper soil compaction and testing. Pursuant to the CGL, the carrier agreed that there was coverage for owner personal property, but not for the cost of repairing the structural damage to the homes (i.e., foundation and wall damage).

The Florida Supreme Court ruled against the insurance carrier, concluding that defective work performed by a subcontractor that cause damage to the developer's completed project, and is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the developer can constitute 'property damage' caused by an 'occurrence' as those terms are defined in a standard form CGL. In turn, a claim mad against the developer for damage to the completed project cause by a subcontractor's defective work is covered under a post-1986 CGL. Since the CGL included a subcontractor-related exception to the CGL's main exclusion, coverage existed.

It is imperative that every board consider the CGL of its developer, when faced with construction defects - especially since a developer's work is almost always performed by a subcontractor. Considering, and being mindful of, this during transition can increase a community's leverage, and options, and lead to a more successful transition.

For more information please contact David J. Byrne, Co-Chair of the Community Associations Practice Group at: dbyrne@stark-stark.com, or review the Florida case,  United States Fire Insurance Co., etc. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., et al (no. SC05-1295).

The Fair Housing Act (the "FHA") makes it illegal to discriminate against any person in the provision of housing-related services and facilities based on familial status. "Familial Status" is defined by the FHA as one or more persons who have not attained the age of 18 who live with a parent or legal guardian. Community Associations are subject to the requirements of the FHA and accordingly must be careful not to discriminate against persons 18 or younger with regard to services or community amenities offered by the Association. Mindful of this, Boards ought to be wary of placing restrictions on pool use based on age. Some common violations include age-based swim tests, adult supervision requirements, adult only swim times and greater restriction on guest allowances for junior members.

Courts across the country routinely strike down rules which require a swim test for only individuals who fall within a certain age group. The court’s rationale is that swimming capabilities have no reasonable connection with age. A 13 year old certainly may be able to swim better than an 18 year old. Unless the Association wishes to test everyone, it cannot restrict swim testing to a certain age group.

Although most courts would agree that adult supervision is viewed as a reasonable and necessary health and safety restriction for children under 12 years, courts have found required adult supervision for children who are 13 years or older as unreasonable and thus in violation of the FHA.

Similarly, many communities wish to enact a rule that allows for "adult only" swim time. However, without a reasonable basis that such a restriction is necessary for health and safety reasons, courts will likely strike such a rule. A better option might be to enact a regulation that allows for time where only swimming laps is permitted. Most often the reason for wanting adult swim time is to offer time in the pool where adults can swim laps without interference. The "lap only" restriction would accommodate this desire, yet not unreasonably discriminate against minors.

Lastly, Boards should be wary of enacting a policy that places greater restrictions on guest attendance for "junior" members. A guest policy should be uniform for all members as to avoid a violation of the FHA.

If you wish to further discuss the FHA and/or any of the restrictions noted above, please contact Megan Christensen at Stark & Stark in the Community Associations Group at (609) 896-9060 or mchristensen@stark-stark.com.